By Andre Duttmann

We discuss where our data is stored, who owns our cloud infrastructure, and how much we depend on foreign technology companies. These are important conversations, and they are becoming increasingly relevant.

But recent developments have brought another aspect of digital sovereignty into focus.

What happens when the technology we depend on is no longer available to us?

Not because our computers stopped working. Not because we suffered a cyberattack. But simply because a decision was made somewhere else that changed how we could use that technology.

This is no longer just a hypothetical question.

When Software Suddenly Becomes Limited

In July 2026, Microsoft introduced changes affecting certain versions of Microsoft Office running on older Apple devices.

Users who could not update their software to supported versions found that applications such as Word, Excel, and PowerPoint could enter what Microsoft calls reduced functionality mode.

They could still open and view their documents, but editing, saving, and creating new documents were no longer possible.

Microsoft explained that the changes were related to updated licensing certificates and software compatibility requirements.

There are technical reasons for such changes, and we are not questioning them.

But consider what this means from the user's perspective.

A computer that worked yesterday might still be perfectly functional today. The documents are still there. The hardware hasn't suddenly become defective.

Yet the ability to use certain software functions has changed because of a requirement determined by the software provider.

For an individual, this might be inconvenient. For a business, school, or government institution operating hundreds or thousands of computers, the consequences could be considerably greater.

And it raises a simple question.

How much control do we really have over technology that we depend on but do not ultimately control?

A More Serious Example: Satellite Communications in Ukraine

Another recent development demonstrates how technological dependency can affect something far more critical than office productivity.

In October 2026, reports emerged that Ukraine's military was experiencing restrictions involving the Starshield satellite communications system, a military-focused service developed by SpaceX using technology related to Starlink.

According to reporting by Reuters and other news organizations, restrictions affected certain military communications and drone operations.

This was not a complete shutdown of internet access across Ukraine. The reported limitations concerned specific capabilities of the military satellite service.

Nevertheless, the restrictions had operational consequences.

The circumstances surrounding these decisions involve government agreements, military operations, and international relations. We are not attempting to evaluate those decisions or the reasons behind them.

That is not the purpose of this article.

What matters to our discussion is the technological dependency this situation demonstrates.

When essential communications infrastructure is controlled outside the organization or country relying on it, changes to that service can have immediate consequences.

It doesn't matter whether those changes result from contractual requirements, technical limitations, commercial decisions, or government policies.

The underlying dependency remains.

And that brings us back to Canada.

What If Something Similar Happened Here?

Imagine a Canadian government department that relies almost entirely on a single foreign cloud provider.

Or a hospital whose administrative systems depend on proprietary software that requires continuous external licensing.

Or a municipality operating essential services on infrastructure that cannot easily be transferred to another provider.

Now imagine that access to one of those services changes unexpectedly.

Perhaps a licensing agreement is modified. Perhaps a service is discontinued. Perhaps international regulations change, or a technology provider decides to stop supporting certain systems.

The reasons could be entirely legitimate.

But would that make the consequences any less significant for the Canadian organizations depending on those services?

Would we have alternatives ready?

Could we move our data and applications elsewhere?

Would our employees have the knowledge and tools necessary to keep essential services running?

And perhaps most importantly, how long would it take us to regain control?

These are questions that deserve serious consideration before a disruption occurs.

Other Countries Are Already Taking Action

Canada is certainly not alone in considering these questions.

Across Europe, governments and public institutions have been examining how they can reduce technological dependencies and maintain greater control over essential digital infrastructure.

In Germany, the state of Schleswig-Holstein has been moving government workplaces away from Microsoft products toward open-source alternatives, including LibreOffice and Linux-based systems.

The objective is not simply to replace one software package with another. It is to establish greater independence, improve interoperability, and reduce long-term dependence on individual vendors.

France has also been exploring ways to strengthen national control over sensitive government data and cloud infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court has pursued alternatives to Microsoft office software, including the European open-source platform openDesk.

These initiatives differ in scope, motivation, and implementation.

But they share an important principle.

Organizations are increasingly recognizing that having reliable technology today is not the same as having control over that technology tomorrow.

Where Open Source Makes a Difference

This is where Linux and open-source technologies become particularly relevant.

Open source does not automatically guarantee digital sovereignty.

A Linux server hosted entirely on infrastructure controlled by an external provider can still create dependencies. Open-source applications may rely on proprietary services, external authentication systems, or infrastructure that an organization does not control.

Digital sovereignty involves much more than simply choosing a particular operating system.

However, open-source technologies provide opportunities that proprietary systems may not offer.

Organizations can examine the software they use, maintain it independently, modify it to meet their requirements, and work with different service providers without necessarily having to replace the underlying technology.

They can develop internal expertise rather than depending exclusively on a single vendor.

They can also collaborate with Canadian companies, educational institutions, and technology professionals to build and maintain their own capabilities.

That flexibility is valuable.

Not because every proprietary technology is unsuitable, but because having meaningful alternatives reduces the consequences of depending on any single provider.

What This Means for Canada

Canada has the expertise, educational institutions, technology companies, and open-source communities necessary to play a much greater role in developing and maintaining its own digital infrastructure.

We already have talented Linux administrators, developers, cybersecurity professionals, researchers, and organizations working with open technologies across the country.

The question is how we bring these capabilities together.

Should Canadian government institutions examine where open-source alternatives could reduce unnecessary dependencies?

Should we invest more in training Canadians to operate and maintain critical digital infrastructure?

Should Canadian technology companies have greater opportunities to provide services built on open standards and interoperable systems?

And should digital sovereignty become a more significant consideration when public institutions make long-term technology procurement decisions?

These questions are worth exploring.

There is also a growing body of Canadian academic research examining these possibilities, including work by Dr. Joshua M. Pearce of Western University on the potential benefits and feasibility of a Canadian national Linux distribution.

Such research provides an opportunity to examine the technical, economic, and organizational implications of developing greater domestic capabilities.

It is a conversation that should involve government, industry, academia, and Canada's open-source community.

Digital Sovereignty Is About Having Choices

The Linux Association of Canada is not advocating that Canada should stop using technology developed outside our borders.

International collaboration has always been an important part of technological progress, and open-source development itself depends heavily on cooperation across countries and organizations.

Nor are we criticizing individual technology providers for making decisions concerning their products, services, or infrastructure.

Companies and governments operate within their own legal, technical, commercial, and operational requirements.

Our concern is different.

We believe Canada should understand the dependencies created by its technology choices and ensure that reasonable alternatives exist where those dependencies could affect essential services.

That means supporting open standards, interoperability, domestic expertise, and infrastructure that Canadian organizations can maintain and control.

It means considering not only what a technology solution can do today, but also what happens if access to it changes tomorrow.

And it means recognizing that digital sovereignty is not something we can establish overnight, especially after years of building systems around technologies controlled elsewhere.

It requires planning, investment, education, and cooperation.

The Question We Cannot Ignore

The recent examples involving Microsoft and satellite communications in Ukraine are very different situations.

One concerns software compatibility and licensing. The other involves critical communications infrastructure during an armed conflict.

We should not confuse the two.

But both illustrate an important reality: the ability to use technology can depend on decisions made outside the control of those relying on it.

That is not an accusation. It is an observation.

And it is precisely why digital sovereignty deserves greater attention in Canada.

We cannot predict every future technical change, commercial decision, international disagreement, or disruption.

But we can prepare.

We can develop alternatives. We can invest in Canadian expertise. We can support open-source technologies and ensure that our institutions have the knowledge and capabilities to operate essential systems independently when necessary.

The goal should never be complete isolation from the rest of the world.

It should be the freedom to make our own decisions and the ability to continue operating when circumstances change.

Digital sovereignty doesn't mean shutting the world out.

It means making sure nobody else can shut us off.